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Criminal Procedure.  In re 38 Studios Grand Jury, 225 A.3d 224 
(R.I. 2020).  The Superior Court does not have inherent authority 
to disclose grand jury materials beyond the scope of rule 6(e) of the 
Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.  The Superior Court 
is statutory in origin, and, as such, the lower court may not act 
outside of the confines of any statute or rule.  
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In 2010, a quasi-public corporation issued $75 million in bonds 
to guarantee loans to 38 Studios, a video game company.1  Two 
years later, 38 Studios failed to honor its obligation to repay the 
bonds and left Rhode Island taxpayers on the hook for $88 million.2  
In 2012, a statewide grand jury investigated potential criminality 
in connection with the 38 Studios deal.3  The grand jury sat for 
eighteen months and completed its work in 2015.4  The 
investigation into potential criminality began before the grand jury 
convened, and approximately 150 individuals were interviewed or 
called to testify before the grand jury.5  At the conclusion of the 
grand jury’s investigation, the Attorney General declared that there 
were not any “provable criminal violations of the Rhode Island 
General [L]aws in connection with” the 38 Studios deal.6   
Independent of the grand jury investigation, the State 
commenced civil litigation against persons and entities connected 
to the 38 Studios deal.7  The State recovered more than $61 million, 
and hundreds of thousands of documents were made public.8  At the 
close of litigation, the Governor filed a petition in the Superior 
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Court seeking “the release of all 38 Studios Grand Jury Records.”9  
The Governor argued that: (1) the Superior Court had the discretion 
to release grand jury materials in exceptional circumstances; (2) 
that exceptional circumstances did in fact exist; and (3) that those 
exceptional circumstances outweighed the need for grand jury 
secrecy.10  The Attorney General opposed the Governor’s petition, 
and the Superior Court heard the petition in April 2017.11   
The presiding justice of the Superior Court determined that she 
did not have the authority to grant the Governor’s petition.12  That 
determination was based on the fact that the Governor was not 
seeking disclosure pursuant to rule 6(e) of the Superior Court Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, which governs grand jury secrecy.13  The 
presiding justice also ruled that, even if the Superior Court had the 
authority to disclose the requested grand jury materials, the grand 
jury materials should not be disclosed because the Governor failed 
to demonstrate a particularized need for the information.14  As 
such, the Superior Court denied the Governor’s petition, and the 
Governor timely appealed.15 
At the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the Governor asserted 
that the Superior Court presiding justice erred in reading rule 6(e) 
as the only way to disclose grand jury materials.16  The Governor 
contended that the Superior Court had “inherent authority” outside 
the scope of rule 6(e) to disclose the requested materials.17  
Additionally, the Governor argued that the presiding justice should 
not have applied the “particularized need” test because the test only 
applies when evaluating a request pursuant to Rule 6(e).18  






14. Id. at 226–27.
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abused her discretion in determining that the Governor “failed to 
meet factors in favor of the release of grand jury materials.”19 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
In determining whether the Superior Court had inherent 
authority to disclose grand jury materials outside the scope of rule 
6(e) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, the 
Supreme Court was tasked with answering a question of first 
impression.  Before addressing the case on its merits, the Court first 
conducted a standing analysis.  Although the Court concluded that 
the Governor did not meet the traditional elements for standing, 
the Court decided to overlook that fact because the case concerned 
a “substantial public interest.”20  As such, the Court moved onto the 
question regarding the Superior Court’s authority to release grand 
jury materials beyond the scope of rule 6(e). 
Rule 6(e) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure 
“codifies the traditional rule of grand jury secrecy.”21  Rule 6(e)(2) 
provides that “any person to whom disclosure is made under 
subdivision (e)(3)(A)(ii) shall not disclose matters occurring before 
the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules.”22 
The next provision of rule 6(e) permits disclosures, in limited 
circumstances, which are “otherwise prohibited by this rule.”23  The 
Governor argued that the permitted disclosures in rule 6(e) are 
“permissive and nonexclusive.”24  More specifically, the Governor 
asserted that the Superior Court has inherent authority to disclose 
grand jury materials when “special or exceptional circumstances” 
exist.25  In contrast, the Attorney General argued that permitted 
disclosures within the rule are “all-inclusive.”26  Moreover, the 
19. Id.
20. See id. at 234.  Relying on Watson v. Fox, the Court recognized that “on
rare occasions this Court has overlooked the standing requirement to deter-
mine the merits of a case of substantial public interest.”  Id. (quoting Watson 
v. Fox, 44 A.3d 130, 138 (R.I. 2012)).
21. In re 38 Studios Grand Jury, 225 A.3d at 236 (citing In re Doe, 717
A.2d 1129, 2 (R.I. 1998)).





846 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:843 
Attorney General contended that the Governor’s request must fail 
because the Governor did not seek disclosure pursuant to rule 
6(e).27  The Court recognized that the Superior Court “derives its 
powers from statutes duly enacted by the Legislature.”28  
Furthermore, the Court concluded that the Superior Court is “not 
permitted to act outside of the mandates of a statute or . . . [a] court 
rule.”29  As such, the Court held that the Superior Court does not 
have inherent authority to disclose grand jury materials “beyond 
that which is permitted by the Superior Court Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.”30  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the 
Superior Court. 
Due to the “heightened public nature of the issues implicated 
by th[e] case,” the Court determined that although it need not 
address the Governor’s argument alleging an error on the part of 
the Superior Court in its alternative analyses, it would do so 
arguendo.31  The Court highlighted  that, even if the Superior Court 
did have inherent authority to disclose the requested materials, the 
presiding justice would have been “well within” her discretion to 
deny the Governor’s petition.32  The Court reasoned that those 
courts that allow disclosure of grand jury materials under “special 
or exceptional circumstances” would have denied the Governor’s 
petition because: (1) the Governor did not seek disclosure of a 
“limited nature,” but rather the Governor sought disclosure of 
virtually all grand jury materials; (2) the grand jury completed its 
work relatively recently; and (3) the public interest is “not yet 
historical in nature.”33 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court was likely presented with a 
great deal of public pressure to release the grand jury materials, 
but they stayed true to the traditional rule of grand jury secrecy. 
As virtually any Rhode Islander will tell you, the 38 Studios deal 
27. Id.
28. Id. at 239.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 240.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 240–42.
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seemed to have a serious stink to it in a way that only Rhode Island 
government seems to be able to replicate.  Nevertheless, the Court 
was brave enough to withstand any presence of public pressure. 
Grand jury secrecy is a core feature of our justice system, and it 
likely prevents the destruction of evidence and witness 
tampering.34  Perhaps more importantly, grand jury secrecy is 
necessary to protect the reputation of an innocent person whose 
conduct has been investigated by a grand jury.35  As Justice 
Flaherty asserted, the grand jury, as an institution, was “designed 
as a means . . . of protecting the citizen against unfounded 
accusation[s].”36  In Douglas Oil Company v. Petrol Stops 
Northwest, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized that 
the “proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the 
secrecy of grand jury proceedings.”37  Moreover, Justice Powell 
asserted that grand jury secrecy assures that “persons who are 
accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to 
public ridicule.”38  Publicizing grand jury materials would certainly 
have a negative impact on the goal to protect citizens from mere 
accusations, and, as such, the cause of justice itself would be 
harmed.   
As a society, we must decide whether we wish to have a justice 
system that seeks the truth or one that merely seeks to allocate 
blame and move on to the next case.  If we choose the latter, then 
we will surely end up scapegoating innocent individuals in the 
name of expediency and efficiency.  But such a system is not a 
justice system at all, rather it is a system of faux justice.  We should 
aim to be a better society and demand a justice system which seeks 
truth.  Ironically, secrecy—within the context of the grand jury as 
an institution—is crucial to facilitating a system which seeks the 
truth.  This is true for two primary reasons.  First, secrecy at grand 
jury proceedings provides witnesses with a level of comfort which 
may “encourage them to make full disclosure of their knowledge of 
subjects and persons under investigation, without fear of evil 
34. See id. at 231 (citing Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an Amer-
ican Grand Jury: Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1, 
12–13 (1996)). 
35. See id. (quoting Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 11 (1887)).
36. Id. at 231 (citing Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. at 11).
37. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979).
38. Id. at 219.
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consequences to themselves.”39  Second, secrecy at grand jury 
proceedings may help to prevent creating “prejudice [in] the mind 
of the public, thus affecting a trial which may follow the action of 
the grand jury.”40  We must strive for a system which avoids 
prejudice, and secrecy at grand jury proceedings is a vital step to 
achieving that goal.  With this holding, the Court defended a core 
tenet of our justice system even in the face of great public pressure. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the Superior Court 
does not have inherent authority to disclose grand jury materials 
beyond the scope of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.  The Court reasoned that the Superior Court derives its 
powers from statutes, and, therefore, the lower court may not act 
outside the confines of a statute or rule.  Furthermore, the Court 
determined that, even if the Superior Court had inherent authority, 
the presiding justice would have been within her discretion to deny 
the Governor’s petition.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower 
court’s decision. 
 Jonathan M. Goyette 
39. See 38 Studios Grand Jury, 225 A.3d at 232 (quoting United States v.
Providence Tribune Co., 241 F. 524, 526 (D.R.I. 1917)). 
40. See id. (quoting Providence Tribune, 241 F. at 526).
